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Calculation of a Population Externality
By HENNING BOHN AND CHARLES STUART
It is known that when people generate externalities, a birth also gener-
ates an externality and efficiency requires a Pigou tax/subsidy on having
children. The size of the externality from a birth is important for study-
ing policy. We calculate the size of this “population externality” in a
specific case: we consider a maintained hypothesis that greenhouse gas
emissions are a serious problem and assume government reacts by op-
timally restricting emissions. Calculated population externalities are
large under many assumptions.
JEL: H23
Keywords: population externality, Pigovian policy
Harford (1997, 1998, 2000) shows that when people generate externalities and par-
ents care about children’s utility, a birth induces an externality and efficiency requires a
child tax or subsidy equal to the induced externality. This is true even if optimal taxes
are imposed on underlying externalities. Harford’s result matters for policy if induced
population externalities are large. We make a case that population externalities may be
large. Specifically, we study a maintained hypothesis that greenhouse gas emissions are a
serious enough problem that emissions must be restricted, and we show that the induced
population externality is large under many assumptions.
An intuition for Harford’s result here is that two decision variables, emissions and fer-
tility, each require a separate instrument if policy is to be efficient. Suppose a positive
optimal tax is imposed on emissions and the revenue is redistributed as equal lump-sums.
This introduces a fixed-common-property externality: an additional child means more
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people in the next generation split the same total redistributions so other parents’ chil-
dren have lower utility. Equivalently, an optimal emissions tax restricts emissions, and
when emissions are restricted to the optimal level, a birth means more people in the next
generation split the same total emissions so living standards are lower. If parents care
about children, a birth therefore harms other parents and efficiency requires a positive
tax on births.1
We use a balanced-growth setting in which output is produced from labor and green-
house gas emissions. To capture how economic growth contributes to emissions, factor
productivities grow exogenously at constant rates as in Solow-type models.2 Popula-
tion and hence labor are determined endogenously by identical dynastic households with
Barro-Becker (1988, 1989) preferences. Government policy is set by representative liv-
ing adults who maximize dynastic utility.
We divide time into two stylized eras. Scientific information about the environmental
impact of emissions the arrives at the dawn of a period indexed t D 0. For t < 0, the
possibility of global warming is unrecognized, emissions are unrestricted, and population
and emissions grow exponentially. We calibrate the model to initial conditions at t D 0.
For t  0, we derive both the population sequence that maximizes the utility of the
representative household taking account of the externality (the optimal population) and
the population sequence households would choose without population policy (the natural
population).3 For most of the paper, we simplify by making environmental damage a step
function that implies catastrophic damage beyond a critical emissions level.4 Optimal
1Golosov, Jones, and Tertilt (2007) discuss alternative notions of efficiency when fertility is endogenous. Efficiency
and optimality in the current paper refer to a state in which living individuals in a period cannot be made better off. This
corresponds to Golosov et al’s “A-efficiency.”
2Kelly and Kolstad (2001) argue that the assumptions in integrated assessment models that productivity and popu-
lation growth fall exogenously to zero are empirically unrealistic and reduce the emissions problem. Consistent with
this, they find the welfare cost of a marginal birth is small if there is no cap and productivity and population growth fall
exogenously to zero.
3Technically, optimal population is derived from a planning problem that can be implemented with emissions taxes
(or caps) and child taxes. Natural population solves the same problem subject to a no-child-tax constraint.
4The focus on catastrophic impacts follows Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), who summarize evidence on emissions costs
and conclude that “market impacts are likely to be relatively small; the major concerns are the potentially catastrophic
impacts.” Pindyck (2013) and Barro (2013) stress the importance of catastrophic outcomes and note that uncertainty is
an analytic obstacle. The maintained hypothesis in the current paper provides an approach for studying catastrophic
outcomes without making assumptions about some of the uncertainties. Note that Golosov et al (2011) derive a formula
for the marginal externality damage from emissions in a model without fertility choice. Among other things, they find
that the optimal carbon tax is higher by a factor of about 10 under Nordhaus’ catastrophic scenarios. The current paper
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emissions policy is then a fixed cap at the critical level. This allows us to focus on
fertility and population policy.
When emissions are restricted, the economy becomes Malthusian in that population
growth reduces per-capita emissions and incomes which in turn restrains population
growth. Living standards still rise over time, however, because of exogenous produc-
tivity growth. Optimal policy leads to a steady state with reduced ratio of emissions to
income and with positive child taxes. Convergence takes many generations and opti-
mal child taxes at t D 0 differ significantly from the steady state, so the dynamics are
important. The economy without child taxes also converges to a steady state, but with
substantially higher population and lower per-capita income than in the optimal steady
state.
We study only one underlying externality. In the real world, people generate many
underlying positive and negative externalities, each of which contributes, positively or
negatively, to an aggregate induced population externality. Evaluating this aggregate
population externality would be a substantial task. The large numerical values of the
population externality we find suggest broadly that numerical evaluation of population
externalities induced by other underlying externalities may be a valuable tool for study-
ing economic pressures to tax or subsidize children.5
Section I describes the setting. Section II briefly describes the balanced-growth path
for t < 0. Section III studies the dynamics of the natural population under an emissions
cap and establishes convergence to a new steady state. Section IV examines the opti-
mal population and child taxes. Section V extends the model by adding time costs of
children, a more general technology, and exogenously-given productivity growth, which
are important for numerics. Section VI presents results for a base-line calibration and
sensitivity analysis. Section VII concludes. All technical claims are proved in an online
appendix.
differs from Golosov et al in that we add fertility as a choice variable to study implications for population policy.
5Two underlying externalities that may contribute positively and substantially to the aggregate population external-
ity are scale or spillover effects in human capital formation (e.g. Kremer, 1993; Jones, 1999), and the pay-as-you-go
externality under which the lifetime social security taxes paid by an additional person benefit all elderly in the previous
generation instead of just the parent (Schoonbroodt and Tertilt, 2011).
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I. Setting
A large number Nt of identical (representative) households in period t each contain
one adult who supplies labor, consumes, and has children. Aggregate labor is L t D lt Nt
where lt is per-capita labor. (Per-capita means per-adult.) Firms produce output Yt under
perfect competition from L t and from Et units of greenhouse gas emissions according
to Yt D F.L t ; Et/.1   t/; where F captures the productivities of labor and emissions
as inputs and t is the share of output lost (damage) from global warming. Government
sets policy to maximize the utility of the adults living in a period. In more detail:
A. Production
Production exhibits constant returns so F.L t ; Et/ D L t f .et/; where et  Et=L t is the
emissions ratio and f is output per unit of labor. We assume f .0/ D 0 for now but relax
this in section V. We also add exogenously-growing factor productivity in section V.
The marginal product of emissions must be driven to zero if emissions are unrestricted
so we assume there is a positive value eC <1 at which f 0.eC/ D 0 with f 0.et/ > 0 and
f 00.et/ < 0 for 0  et < eC; as in figure 1. If emissions are restricted, output is reduced
as indicated by the arrows in figure 1.
Figure 1. Input Distortion, and Geometry of the Real Population Externality f 0.e/e:
B. Environmental Damages and Dynamics
A general representation is that damages t D .Xt/ are a function of environmental
state variables Xt that follow a process Xt D 2.Xt 1; Et 1/. Science suggests that Xt is
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a vector of high dimension and that2 includes multiple feedback loops and complicated
non-linear relationships.
We first formulate the government’s policy problem based on this general represen-
tation, then simplify to focus on population. We initially impose three simplifying as-
sumptions:
S1: Damages are catastrophic for a set of environmental states X : .X/ D 1 for X 2 X .
S2: There is a critical emissions level OE such that2.Xt ; Et/ 2 X if and only if Et > OE .
S3: Non-catastrophic damages are zero: .X/ D 0 for X =2 X .
Under (S1-S3), damages tC1 D
8<: 0 if Et  OE1 if Et > OE are a step function of emissions,
which makes optimal emissions policy simple (a cap at OE , as we verify below).
Assumptions S1-S2 formalize the maintained assumption that global warming is se-
rious enough that emissions must be restricted. S1 captures the idea that catastrophic
damages are a threat. S2 links catastrophe in the next generation to emissions, regardless
of initial conditions. This is a strong assumption designed to simplify emissions policy.
S3 avoids the distraction of small damages. We relax (S1-S3) in Section VI and compute
optimal policies numerically for more general specifications for  and 2. The existence
of X and the value OE are discovered at t D 0. Choices for t < 0 are made under the
belief that  D 0 for all .X; E/.
C. The Mechanism of Emissions Policy
To model emissions policy, we consider a simple auction procedure. Emissions with-
out a permit are forbidden. The government auctions E pt permits in period t , each permit
allowing one unit of emissions in the period, and distributes the revenue as equal lump
sums to households.6
6This treats permits as valid for a single period, which fits U.S. legislative proposals that state permits are not property
rights and nothing restricts future government from terminating or limiting an emission allowance.
We show in the appendix that the population externality would be internalized by parents if current government can
and does establish iron-clad permanent private property rights to the public revenue stream from all permits to t D 1.
This is an interesting idea but is difficult to achieve in practice. Permanence fails if government later changes policy to
expropriate “permanent” rights. The U.S. legislative proposals effectively acknowledge that this cannot be prevented.
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A representative firm maximizes profits f .et/.1 t/L t  pt Et wt L t , where pt is the
price of a permit and wt is the wage. The first-order conditions are pt D f 0.et/.1   t/
andwt D [ f .et/ e f 0.et/].1 t/. The former defines the demand for emission permits.
If E pt  eCL t , emission restrictions do not bind: pt D 0 and et D eC, so firms emit
Et D eCL t and pay a wage wt D f .eC/.1   t/. If E pt < eCL t , emission restrictions
bind: Et D E pt , et D E pt =L t < eC, pt > 0, and wt < f .eC/.1   t/. By choosing
E pt , government effectively sets emissions to Et D minfE pt ; eCL tg. Thus the auction
quantity E pt can be interpreted as a cap on emissions.
Note that the government could use taxes to set emissions instead of auctioning per-
mits: imposing a tax of pt D f 0.minfeC; E pt =L tg/.1  t/ per unit emissions would also
hold emissions to Et D minfE pt ; eCL tg. Tax and auction mechanisms are thus equiva-
lent; either way, the government can choose Et 2 [0; eCL t ] and obtains revenue pt Et .
Government revenue pt Et implies per-capita transfers of pt Et=Nt D pt et . Hence
wages plus transfers equal output per-capita: yt D wt lt C pt et D f .et/.1  t/ D Yt=Nt .
D. Preferences
A large number of representative dynastic households trade off own consumption and
number of children. Own consumption ct  0 is per-capita income yt less the output
cost of having and raising nt  0 children to adulthood: ct D yt   nt , where  is the
output cost of a child and nt is a continuous choice variable. Maximum feasible fertility
is yt= .
We assume initially that per-capita labor does not depend on fertility and is normalized
to one (lt D 1), so aggregate labor equals population (L t D Nt ). An extension in Section
V adds time costs of children which reduce lt .
We follow Barro and Becker’s (1988, 1989) specification of household preferences. A
period-t adult’s utility Ut is utility u from own consumption plus utility from children:
(1) Ut D u.ct/C .nt/UtC1:
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Utility from children is the utility of a child (UtC1) times a weight  that depends on the
number of children. Adults die at the end of a period; their children become economi-
cally active as adults in the next period. When all households choose the same nt , the
population growth factor is also nt , that is, NtC1 D nt Nt :
We assume power utility with curvature parameter  > 0:
(2) u.c/ D 1
1   c
1  I
the power form is needed later to allow for balanced growth. We also assume  is a
power function with curvature parameter b > 0:7
(3) .n/ D b0n1 b,
where 0 < b0 < 1. In Barro and Becker’s original specification, u is positive so  < 1;
and  is increasing and concave so b < 1. These assumptions ensure that parent’s
utility rises at a decreasing rate with the number of children. Jones, Schoenbroodt, and
Tertilt (2008) and Jones and Schoonbroodt (2010) show that parent’s utility also rises at
a decreasing rate with the number of children if utility is negative so  > 1 and if  is
decreasing and convex so b > 1. We allow either . < 1; b < 1/ or . > 1; b > 1/.8
From (1) - (3), contribution of children to parent’s utility can be written .nt/u.ctC1/ D
.nt c
!
tC1/
1 bb0=.!.1   b// where !  .1   /=.1   b/ is the weight a parent places on
per-child consumption relative to the number of children. In the case of equal curvatures
( D b, so ! D 1) the contribution depends on children’s aggregate consumption, nt ctC1:
This case may be reasonable if parents view children’s aggregate consumption as an
economic resource; it will serve as baseline for our numerical analysis.9
7Power  has a sensible property: it is equivalent to assuming the utility an adult derives from grandchildren,
.nt /.ntC1/UtC2; is independent of the number of children—see appendix.
8For . < 1; b < 1/, utility (1) is infinite unless .n/ < 1 for all feasible n; to ensure bounded U , we assume
 > b1=.1 b/0 f .eC/ for b < 1, which implies . f .eC/=/ < 1. For . > 1; b > 1/, U is always bounded above.9We do not specifically rule out cases with ! greater or less than one. Values of ! far less than one imply that parents
care little about their children’s consumption relative to the number of children. However, this may be difficult to square
with small families in which parents devote substantial resources to ensuring children’s consumptions.Values ! > 1
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E. Government Policy
The government maximizes the utility of current adults. We consider two settings for
policy. One is the government’s (basic) planning problem, which is to maximize utility
subject to a resource constraint. The solution addresses all externalities optimally. Its im-
plementation as market equilibrium generally requires child taxes or equivalent tools of
population policy, in addition to emissions policy. Controls on emissions are empirically
plausible and naturally motivated by environmental externalities. In contrast, child taxes
are not a generally-accepted policy tool, and controls on fertility such as the one-child
policy in China have a history of controversy. An allocation with optimal emissions pol-
icy but no child taxes is therefore a natural benchmark for studying optimal population.
It is derived below as solution to a planning problem with no-child-tax constraint.
Consider first the basic planning problem. The government in a period t0 maxi-
mizes Ut0 for given .Nt0;Xt0/ by choice of sequences fNtC1; Etgtt0 subject to ct D
f .Et=Nt/.1 .Xt// NtC1=Nt . The problem is recursive but non-standard because of
the endogenous discount factor .nt/ in (1). Alvarez (1999) has shown that solutions (if
any) can be obtained by solving the transformed problem of maximizing Vt  .Nt/ Ut .
For general damages  and dynamics 2, this problem has the Bellman equation:
(4) V .Nt ;Xt/ D max
NtC1;Et
f.Nt/u.ct/C b0V .NtC1;2.Et ;Xt//g,
where Et 2 [0; eCNt ] and NtC1 2 [0; f .Et=Nt/.1  .Xt//Nt= ].
Problem (4) provides a conceptual framework, but assumptions about .;2/ are needed
to obtain insightful results. In particular, we impose S1-S3 (until Section VI-E).
Under S1-S3 and assuming Xt =2 X (no catastrophe), ct D f .Et=Nt/   NtC1=Nt
does not depend on Xt so V depends only on population. Optimal emissions policy is
then a simple cap, Et D minfeCNt ; OEg, which maximizes current output while avoiding
imply that the marginal utility to parents of children’s consumption is increasing. As described below, this may cause
non-concavity of the optimal population problem.
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catastrophe. Given the optimal cap, the planning problem can be written concisely as
(5) V .Nt/ D max
NtC1
(
.Nt/u
 
f .minfeC; OE
Nt
g/   NtC1
Nt
!
C b0V .NtC1/
)
.
The solution to (5) defines the optimal population fN t gt>t0 . Throughout, superscripts 
and the label optimal refer to solutions to the basic planning problem, or equivalently, to
allocations with jointly optimal emissions and child taxes. (For completeness, we must
verify uniqueness and that catastrophe is undesirable–see appendix.)
Now consider the planning problem without child taxes. Policy is then constrained by
household fertility choices. Generically (dropping time subscripts), a household chooses
n to maximize
(6) U .n; y;U /  u.y   n/C .n/U;
taking income y and the utility of future generations U as given. The first-order condition
(7) U n .n; y;U / 
dU 
dn
D  u0.y   n/ C  0.n/U D 0:
defines a unique individually-optimal fertility n 2 .0; y=/ for given .y;U /. In the
planning problem, zero child taxes imply that (7) is an implementation constraint.
The government’s problem without child taxes and with general ( ;2) is then to maxi-
mize (4) subject to (7), where (7) is evaluated at n D NtC1=Nt , y D .1 .Xt// f .Et=Nt/,
and U D V .NtC1;2.Et ;Xt//, and V  denotes the value function. Under S1-S3, again
Xt drops out, so optimal emissions are Et D minfeCNt ; OEg by the reasoning above. The
natural population fN t gt>t0 is then determined iteratively by the individual choices in
(7). Throughout, superscripts  and the label natural refer to allocations without child
taxes. Note that under S1-S3, optimal and natural populations are directly comparable
because emissions policies are the same.
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II. Population In the No-cap Era
The no-cap era means periods t < 0 when damages from emissions are not recog-
nized. Then the recursive utility (1) and the first-order condition (7) imply a perfect-
foresight solution with constant utility UC and fertility nC. Specifically, constant utility
in (1) implies U D u. f .e/  n/=.1  .n//. Substituting this into (7) yields
(8) S.n; e/   u0. f .e/  n/ C 
0.n/
1  .n/u. f .e/  n/ D 0:
Fertility nC solves S.nC; eC/ D 0; such an nC exists and is unique. Then UC D
u. f .eC/  nC/=.1  .nC//.10
In general, nC may be greater or less than one. Fertility is greater than one as long
as child costs are not too great a fraction of output. To focus on equilibria in which
population and emissions grow so emissions can be a problem, we assume
(9)  <  f .eC/ where   1=

1C .1  /.1  b0/
.1  b/b0

< 1:
Equation (9) rearranges to S.1; eC/ > 0; which ensures nC > 1. Population and emis-
sions then grow without bound at constant rate nC   1 > 0.
III. Natural Population in the Cap Era
The cap era starts in period t D 0, when damages from greenhouse gas emissions are
discovered. Under assumptions (S1-S3) and no child taxes, government optimally caps
emissions at OE .
Generally, population cannot grow without bound when emissions are bounded, be-
cause unbounded population would drive output per unit of labor f .e/ below  and so
fertility would fall below replacement. Under a regularity condition described below,
natural population instead converges monotonically to a unique steady-state level N ss .
10Under zero damages, NtC1 D nCNt , Et D eCNt , and V .Nt ; X t / D .Nt /UC solve (4), so the individually-
rational fertility is also optimal.
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(Subscripts ss denote a variable’s steady-state value.)
The household problem in the cap era satisfies the recursion (1) and the first-order
condition (7) for all t; which can be written as pair of first-order difference equations in
fUt ; Ntgt0:
Ut D u. f .e.Nt//   NtC1Nt /C .
NtC1
Nt
//UtC1;(10)
U n .t/   u0

f .e.Nt//   NtC1Nt

 C  0

NtC1
Nt

UtC1 D 0:(11)
where e.Nt/  minfeC; OE=Ntg.11
A steady state is a pair .U ss; N ss/ that satisfies (10) and (11) with Ut D UtC1 D U ss
and Nt D NtC1 D N ss . The latter implies that steady-state fertility equals replacement:
nss D 1. Moreover, ess D e.N ss/ is a constant, U ss D u. f .ess/  /=.1   .1//, and
ess must satisfy the steady-state condition S.ess/  S.1; ess/ D 0. We show in the
appendix that S crosses zero exactly once on [ f  1./; eC] so ess exists and is unique.
Thus N ss D OE=ess exists and is unique. Because S.1; eC/ > 0, it must be that ess < eC
so the cap binds in steady state.
A perfect-foresight path is a sequence fU t ; N t gt0 that satisfies (10) and (11) for all t .
Population growth in (11) depends on individual fertility, which is driven by income and
children’s utility. The impact of income on fertility is given by the partial elasticity
(12) "n;y  y
n
@n
@y
D   yU

ny
nU nn
D

b

 c
y
C n
y
 1
;
in (7), which is positive by assumptions on primitives. (This elasticity differs concep-
tually from many empirically estimated income elasticities: "n;y holds children’s utility
constant, netting out how fertility changes with income via changes in children’s well-
being.)
The impact of children’s utility on fertility depends on b. This is because the marginal
11Since optimal emissions policy under S1-S3 is a cap at OE , solving the household problem suffices to derive the
equilibrium allocation; writing this as planning problem would needlessly complicate the exposition.
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benefit of a child in (7) and (11) is  0U; which rises with U when b < 1 (so  0 > 0) and
falls with U when b > 1 (so  0 < 0).12 Ceteris paribus, a reduction in children’s utility
reduces fertility if b < 1 but raises fertility if b > 1.
If fertility is too sensitive to changes in population then a population increase from t to
t C 1 could reduce fertility so much that population decreases from t C 1 to t C 2, which
means that population would “overshoot” its steady-state value. To rule out overshooting,
we restrict the sensitivity of fertility to changes in population by assuming
(13) "nt ;yt
 f 0.et/et
f .et/

< 1;
at the steady state and at all t .13 We show in the appendix that the system (10) and (11)
is then saddle-path stable and that population converges monotonically to N ss from any
initial population N0 > 0.
Fertility along the perfect-foresight path is a function of population, nt D .Nt/.
Population dynamics follow from  as shown in figure 2. Suppose the need to cap
emissions at OE is discovered when population has grown to N0 D OE=eC, which means
that uncapped emissions would equal OE . To minimize clutter, choose units so eC D 1,
OE D 1, and N0 D 1. Without a cap, fertility would be nC in period 0; at point a. When
the cap is imposed, fertility instead jumps to .N0/ D .1/, at b. In period 1; the
economy is therefore at c with population N1 D .N0/  N0 and fertility .N1/, at c.
The economy then iterates down the fertility function and converges to population N ss
with fertility .N ss/ D 1. If the need to cap emissions were discovered earlier (when
N0 < 1) or later (N0 > 1), the jump in fertility from nC to  would take place at a lower
or higher population, and then the economy would iterate along  to the same steady
state.
12Formally, (7) implies @n@U D  0.n/=. Unn/, where Unn < 0.
13In (13), "nt ;yt is the partial elasticity of fertility with respect to income (12) and the factor share f 0.et /et= f .et / is
also the elasticity of income with respect to population. Note that (13) is not very strong. Because f 0.e/e < f .e/, (13)
holds if "n;y  1, which holds in turn if b   . On the other hand, if "n;y > 1 then fertility tends to fall off sharply as a
declining emissions ratio reduces income so the factor share remains small, and (13) can still easily hold.
VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE POPULATION EXTERNALITY 13
Figure 2. Population Dynamics Under an Emissions Freeze
The shape of the fertility function  depends on b: There are two forces, operating
through (current) income and children’s utility. First, a binding cap ( OE < eCNt ) re-
duces income. This acts to reduce fertility increasingly as Nt rises above OE=eC. Second,
households know the cap will eventually bind. Because utility is determined recursively,
children’s utility is therefore less than UC as soon as the need to cap emissions is discov-
ered (even if eCNt < OE). When b < 1, households react to the utility decline by reducing
fertility, so fertility lies below nC and falls with Nt to the steady state at N ss; as in figure
2. When b > 1, reduced utility raises fertility, so  is above nC for N  OE=eC and in
a neighborhood of OE=eC, but the negative income effect dominates at high N -values and
ensures that N ss exists.14
As noted, this section focuses on policy under (S1-S3). For general (2, ), conditions
for convergence would depend on environmental dynamics. Note, however, that if op-
timal policy leads to a steady state .Ess;Xss/ for the physical environment, (1) and (7)
would imply a steady-state condition for ess similar to S D 0 (see appendix). Population
would have a finite steady state N ss D Ess=ess , and fertility would be influenced by the
same forces as in this section.
14A numerical illustration of  with b > 1 is in figure 5 below. The utility effect explains why Nss tends to be high
in the numerical analysis when b > 1.
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IV. Optimal Population in the Cap Era
Now consider optimal policy under assumptions (S1-S3). While solutions to the Bell-
man equation (5) exist for all .; b/, their description requires technical restrictions. For
! D .1   /=.1   b/  1, the value function V  turns out to be unique, strictly con-
cave, and differentiable, and optimal population is a single-valued continuous function
N tC1  H.Nt/. Moreover, there is a unique steady-state N ss , and the elasticity condi-
tion (13) is sufficient for population to converge monotonically to N ss from any initial
N0 > 0. For ! > 1, matters are more complicated, but similar results hold provided
N0 is suitably bounded away from zero and ! is not too far above one.15 The following
assumes differentiable V  and single-valued optimal policy H.N /.
From the first-order and envelope conditions implied by (5), one can show that steady-
state population N ss must satisfy S. OE=N ss/ D 0, where
S.e/    .1  b0/ u0.c/C b0u.c/  b0u0.c/ f 0.e/e(14)
D .1  b0/ S.e/  b0u0. f .e/  / f 0.e/e:
This optimal steady-state condition differs from the natural steady-state condition (S D
0) by a term that reflects the population externality. A root ess D OE=N ss that solves
S.ess/ D 0 exists and lies strictly between ess and eC.16 Because ess < ess , steady-state
optimal population N ss is less than steady-state natural population N ss :
The optimal population sequence fN t gt0 starting from given N0 > 0 can be computed
by iterating on H . Optimal fertility nt D .Nt/  H.Nt/=Nt follows from the optimal
population. As with natural fertility, optimal fertility: (i) jumps at t D 0 from nC to a
new value, .N0/; and (ii) approaches nss D 1 as population converges to N ss .
As in the previous section, we focus on (S1-S3); again, if the general problem (4)
15Complications arise because the return function v.Nt ; NtC1/  .Nt /u

f .minfeC; OE=Nt g/  NtC1=Nt

in (5)
is not strictly concave unless ! < 1. If ! D 1, V  is nonetheless strictly concave, but if ! > 1, V  is not concave for
small N . Applications of the Barro-Becker model commonly assume !  1 (e.g. Jones and Schoonbroodt, 2010). We
discuss ! > 1 to emphasize that cases with  D b in Section VI are not borderline cases.
16The details are that S is continuous, S.ess / D  u0 f 0e < 0 (because S.1; ess / D 0 and ess < eC/, and
S.eC/ > 0 (because S.1; eC/ > 0 and f 0.eC/ D 0/.
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leads to a steady state .Ess;Xss/, steady-state values ess and N ss D Ess=ess would be
determined by a condition similar to (14).
A. The Population Externality: Comparing Natural and Optimal Populations
We evaluate the population externality by examining individual utility U .Nt/ along
the optimal path. From (5), U  D V = must satisfy the recursion
(15) U .Nt/ D max
nt
fu.ct/C .nt/U .nt Nt/g.
Hence optimal fertility must satisfy the first-order condition
U n   u0.ct / C  0.nt /U .N tC1/C .nt /N t
dU 
d N
.N tC1/ D 0(16)
D U n .nt ; f .e.N t //;U .N tC1//C .nt /N t
dU 
d N
.N tC1/;
where U n was defined in (7). For .y;U / D . f .e.N t //;U .N tC1//, a household would
set U n .n; y;U / D 0, so optimal and natural fertilities differ. The term .nt /N t dUd N .N tC1/
is ignored by households; it measures the population externality in units of parent’s util-
ity.
To evaluate dUd N .N

tC1/, the envelope theorem applied to (15) implies:
(17) dU

d N
.N tC1/ D  u.ctC1/ f 0.e.N tC1//
e.N tC1/
N tC1
C .ntC1/ntC1
dU 
d N
.N tC2/.
Reapplying (17) iteratively to eliminate successive future derivatives of U , the future
terms collapse into the discounted sum
(18) dU

d N
.N tC1/ D  
1
N tC1
1X
iD1
"
i 1Y
jD1
.ntC j /
#
u0.ctCi / f 0.e.N tCi //e.N tCi /.
The infinite sum reflects the fact that a birth at t creates a new dynasty whose members
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increase populations after t C 1 and also generate externalities.
The terms f 0.etCi /etCi in (18) are aggregate real population externalities measured in
units of output or equivalently in units of descendants’ consumption at t C i . Remaining
terms convert the real population externalities into units of parent’s (period-t) utility. The
negative sign shows the externality reduces utility.
There are three interpretations of the term f 0.etCi /etCi . First, the market value at price
f 0 of the emissions produced by a person born at t C i  1, which come at the expense of
emissions by everyone else under a cap. Second, the loss of per-capita output caused by
a person born at t C i   1: output f .e.NtCi // is lower by f 0.etCi /etCi=NtCi I summing
over the population at t C i gives an aggregate loss of f 0.etCi /etCi : Third, the dilution
of rents from auction revenue. When government auctions OE permits, it receives total
revenue ptCi OE D f 0.etCi / OE that it redistributes as equal lump sums so each person
indirectly receives emission revenue f 0.etCi /etCi : With an additional birth at t C i   1,
the population at t C i loses the revenue f 0.etCi /etCi that goes to the additional person.
Because any cap eventually binds, the discounted externality sum in dUd N .N

tC1/ is
strictly negative for all t even if population is initially so low that Nt < eCEt , so the
cap does not yet bind and period-t permits have zero price.17 Thus starting from any
population Nt , the optimal population at t C 1 is always less than the natural population.
B. Pigou Taxes on Having Children
To compute the sequence of child taxes that would be needed to change fertility and
population to optimal levels, we assume child-tax revenue is redistributed to households
as equal lump sums. Let  t denote a tax per child and let Nnt denote the average over
households of nt in t; so each household pays child taxes  t nt and receives lump-sum
transfers of per-capita revenue  t Nnt .
With child taxes, overall child costs include taxes and overall transfers includes lump-
sum redistributions of child-tax revenue, so an individual household generically maxi-
mizes u.w C TR   n   n/ C .n/U taking w; TR D pE=N C  Nn, and  as given.
17Formally: e.Nt /! ess < eC implies f 0.et / > 0 for some t so dU

d N .N

tC1/ < 0.
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The first-order condition is
(19) U n .n; w C TR;U j/   u0.w C TR   n   n/. C /C  0.n/U D 0:
To implement the optimal population sequence, each optimal tax  t must be set so
nt ; which solves (16), also solves (19). Setting U n from (16) equal to Un from (19) and
noting that wt C TRt    t nt D f .e.N t // and UtC1 D U .N tC1/ along the optimal path,
 t must satisfy u0. f .e.N t //  nt / t D  .nt /N t dUd N .N tC1/. From (18),
 t D
.nt /N t
u0.ct /

 dU

d N
.N tC1/

(20)
D .n

t /
nt
1X
iD1
"
i 1Y
jD1
.ntC j /
#
u0.ctCi /
u0.ct /
f 0.e.N tCi //e.N tCi /:
Because the externality sum dUd N .N

tC1/ is strictly negative, optimal taxes are strictly
positive for all t  0. Optimal child taxes are Pigou taxes, as in Harford (1998):
the optimal tax equals the discounted present value of the externalities generated by a
child and all descendants of the child. The terms in (20) other than the real externalities
f 0.e.N tC1//e.N tC1/ can be interpreted as the number of descendants in a future period
times products of single-period discount factors. Overall, the  t measure population
externalities in units of parent’s consumption.
V. Extensions
We extend the model in three ways for calibrations:
A. Time costs of children
To account correctly for costs of having children, we also include time costs. This
matters for the calibration because emissions restrictions that reduce et also reduce the
wage rate and hence the cost of having a child. The resulting boost in fertility makes it
more challenging for policy to reduce fertility.
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We assume having a child requires a constant amount of parental time  in addition
to output : Time spent having a child reduces labor supply so lt D 1    nt depends
on fertility, total labor supply L t D .1    nt/Nt differs from population Nt , and the
emissions ratio depends on fertility: et D min

eC; OE=[.1   nt/Nt ]

.
With time costs, household income depends on time cost and fertility: yt D .1  
 nt/ f .et/ D .1    nt/wt C f 0.et/Et=Nt , which is again the sum of wage income
and transfers. The marginal cost of a child becomes  C  wt , the sum of the out-
put cost and foregone wages. The generic household first-order condition (7) becomes
U n .n; w; TR;U /   u0 ..1   n/w C T R   n/  . C  w/ C  0U D 0, where
w D f .e/   f 0.e/e and T R D f 0.e/E=N enter separately (not only through income).
Whereas households take w and T R as given, optimal policy must recognize the depen-
dence of .w; T R/ on fertility and population.
The changes implied by time costs carry through the dynamics and steady-state con-
ditions. Notably, the steady-state function S defined in (8) gains terms and becomes
S.n; e/ D  u0.c/. C  w/ C  0.n/u.c/=[1   .n/] where c D .1    / f .e/    and
w D f .e/   f 0.e/e. Roots of the resulting steady-state conditions S.nC; eC/ D 0,
S.ess/ D S.1; ess/ D 0; and S.ess/ D 0 exist as before. Condition (9), which en-
sures nC > 1; gains a time-cost term  f .eC/ and becomes  C  f .eC/ <  f .eC/.
The steady-state optimal and natural populations are N ss D OE=[.1    /ess] and N ss D
OE=[.1   /ess]. As before, ess < ess < eC, so N ss < N ss .
B. Backstop Technology
A common assumption in integrated assessment models is that a “backstop” technol-
ogy may allow positive output without emissions. Backstop output is a positive value
f .0/. If f .0/ is low enough, specifically, if f .0/ < f B  =.    /, then steady-state
natural and optimal populations exists as above.
If f .0/ > f B; however, income loss from a cap is insufficient to reduce fertility to
replacement so the population does not converge to a steady-state value. Natural fertility
converges instead to the unique root nss > 1 of S.nss; 0/ D 0, population grows without
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bound, et ! 0, and f .et/ ! f .0/.18 Optimal fertility converges to the same limit as
natural fertility: nss D nss . For all finite periods, however, optimal fertility is less than
natural fertility, so the population externality exists and the optimal child tax is positive.
(That is, the terms f 0.etCi /etCi in (18) and in (20) are positive.) Optimal population is
therefore less than optimal population at all t and in the limit.
The backstop output level f .0/ is key to knowing the economy’s fate under a cap.
As long as f .0/ < f B , a cap ultimately leads to a steady state with output low enough
to choke off population growth. This is true even if the cost of eliminating almost all
emissions is small: fertility then would remain high so e would continue to drop, until
output is low enough so .N / D 1.
C. Exogenous Growth in Factor Productivity
To add exogenous productivity growth, we assume production is
(21) Yt D F.L tt ; Ett/;
where   1 is an exogenously given growth factor for labor productivity and   1
is an exogenously given growth factor for emissions productivity. Greater emissions
productivity t means fewer emissions are needed to produce a given output from a
given amount of labor.
We assume the output cost of a child grows with labor productivity t ; so the household
budget becomes ct D yt   tnt : The idea is that greater productivity means more
human capital, which requires that more resources be put into each child. The assumed
proportionality of the output cost of a child to t ensures that child costs do not vanish
or explode as a fraction of income merely because productivity grows, which ensures
balanced growth.19
18Because et lt Nt D OE , a value et D 0 is inconsistent with OE > 0. Thus there is no meaningful ess D 0, but allocations
with et > 0 in which et ! 0 are meaningful. In the non-generic case with f .0/ D f B , et ! 0 and nt ! 1, so the limit
condition is S.1; 0/ D 0.
19Section VI.D discusses child quality and demographic transitions, which also relate to growth in child costs.
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An economy with growing productivity is equivalent to an economy with stationary
values of growth-adjusted variables, marked with tildes. The key state variable is the
growth-adjusted population QNt  Ntt=t . Define growth-adjusted fertility Qnt  nt=,
which is the growth factor for QNt , and define costs per growth-adjusted child Q   =
and Q  =, so Q Qnt D  nt and Q Qnt D nt . Define growth-adjusted income Qyt 
yt=t and emissions ratio Qet  Et=[.1   Q Qnt/ QNt ], so Qct D Qyt   Q Qnt and Qyt D .1  
Q Qnt/ f . Qet/. Utility QUt  Ut=.1 /t then satisfies the recursion (1) in growth-adjusted
form: QUt D u. Qct/ C Q. Qn/ QUtC1, where Q. Qnt/  .1 /. Qnt=/ D .1 /.nt/. Hence
the problem of maximizing QVt D Q. QNt/ QUt by choice of . QNt ; Et/ has the same form as
the problem without productivity growth, except that growth-adjusted (tilde) variables
replace regular variables. All analysis from the previous sections goes through with
growth-adjusted variables and parameters replacing regular variables and parameters.
In the no-cap era, the emissions ratio is Qet D eC and household income follows yCt 
.1   Q Qnt/ f .eC/t : A perfect-foresight solution is pair . QnC; QUC/ with QUC D u..1  
Q QnC/ f .eC/  Q QnC/=.1  Q. QnC//;where QnC is optimal given QUC: In any solution, growth-
adjusted population grows at rate QnC   1. Because Et D Qet.1   Q QnC/ QNt and Qet D eC,
emissions also grow at rate QnC   1. We assume Q C Q f .eC/ < Q f .eC/ where Q D
1=[1C !.1  Q.1//= Q.1/] < 1, so QnC > 1.20
In the cap era, growth-adjusted optimal population converges to a steady-state value
QN ss . Unless  D ; actual (non-growth-adjusted) population changes over time when
growth-adjusted population is constant in steady state. Specifically, Qnss D nss= D 1
implies nss D =. This is a balanced-growth condition.21 Growth in labor productiv-
ity (/ introduces an increasing trend in each person’s emissions footprint and growth
in emissions productivity (/ introduces a decreasing trend, so exogenous productivity
growth overall introduces per-capita emissions growth with factor = per period. To
20Emissions have increased historically, consistent with QnC > 1: If future fertility were to fall sufficiently due to
changes in tastes or if = were to fall sufficiently, then QnC could fall below one. Then emissions and the emissions
problem would eventually vanish.
21The production function (21) implies that output growth arises from growth in the inputs lt Ntt and Ett . In steady
state with actual fertility constant at nss ; effective labor .1   nss /Ntt has growth factor nss: Because emissions are
capped at OE , the input Ett has growth factor . Balanced growth requires nss D ; or nss D =:
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hold total emissions constant in steady state, population must therefore grow with factor
=. By analogous reasoning, steady-state natural fertility is also nss D =:
Four growth factors describe steady states in the cap era. The steady-state optimal
and natural populations grow with factor =; as just noted. Outputs per person and
living standards grow with factor  because Qyss D yt =t and Qyss D yt =t are constant.
Total outputs, the products of population and output per person, grow with factor ,
the product of = and . Finally total emissions are constant, as output grows with
the emissions-productivity growth factor . The outcome is Malthusian modified for
productivity growth: living standards continue to grow as long as  > 1; total outputs
continues to grow as long as  > 1; and population grows (or shrinks) unless  D .
Taxes in the transformed economy, Q t   t.=/=t , are taxes per growth-adjusted
child scaled by productivity growth. To convert optimal taxes Q t to taxes per actual child
 t ; we divide out the adjustment factor .=/=t . The actual tax grows with factor ; as
does actual income along the optimal path, yt  .1   Q Qnt / f . Qet /t . In the calibrations
below we remove growth factors by reporting optimal taxes as shares of income22
f=ygt 
 t
yt
D Q

t =
.1  Q Qnt / f . Qet /
.
VI. Calibration
We calibrate the model to a growing world economy with annual steady-state popula-
tion growth of 1.4 percent, per-capita output growth of 1.7 percent, and aggregate emis-
sions growth of 1.8 percent, which were actual world rates over 1990-2005.23 A period
equals 30 years, so nC D 1: 52, QnC D nC= D 1:72;  D 1:48; and  D 1:67.24 The
value of b0 is chosen so the household’s first-order condition holds given these growth
22To interpret f=ygt in a real world with two-adult households, each parent can be seen as paying one-half of the tax
so the tax on any single child as a share of household income is f=ygt =2: For the couple to replace themselves takes two
children, so each would pay f=ygt for replacement.
23see World Resources Institute (2008). Trend assumptions matter–see sensitivity analysis below.
24Specifically nC D exp.30  :014/ D 1: 52: Per-capita income grows with factor  so  D exp.30  :017/ D 1: 67:
Total emissions grow at the same rate as productivity-adjusted population, so QnC D nC= D exp.30  :018/ D 1:72.
This implies  D nC= QnC D 1:48:
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rates. We choose units so QN0 D N0 D 1, f .eC/ D 1, and eC D 1. Unless noted, all
variables except child taxes are growth-adjusted.
We consider two production functions. Cobb-Douglas production is f . Qe/ D f0 Qe f1. f2 
Qe/1  f1 where f0; f1 2 .0; 1/; and f2 are parameters.25 With Cobb-Douglas production,
the factor share of emissions rises monotonically from zero at eC to f1 as Qe falls to zero.
For any f1, units choices pin down f0 and f2: f 0.eC/ D 0 implies f2 D eC= f1, and
f .eC/ D 1 implies f0 D [ f1=.1   f1/]1  f1=eC. To set f1; we assume it costs 3 per-
cent of output to reduce emissions by 25 percent, so f .0:75  eC/ D 0:97. This implies
f1 D 0:483: A 3-percent cost is in the range of estimates in Stern (2007). We also
evaluate a 2-percent cost below, with f1 D 0:371.
Cobb-Douglas production does not allow a positive backstop. To study a backstop and
get a sense of how sensitive results are to the form of production, we also consider the
abatement-cost specification used in many integrated assessment models: f . Qe/ D 1  
.1 g0/.1 Qe=eC/g1;where g0 and g1 are parameters and backstop output is f .0/ D g0:26
When we assume no backstop (g0 D 0), we set g1 by again assuming it costs 3 percent
of output to reduce emissions by 25 percent, so g1 D 3:32: With a positive backstop, we
leave the curvature g1 unchanged and simply assume a positive g0;which proportionately
reduces abatement costs at any Qe:
We assume children have an output cost of  D 0:138 and a time cost of  D 0:110;
which are based on U.S. data. The output cost is from the sum of expenditures by families
on children plus expenditures on K-12 and college education. The time cost assumes the
difference between male and female labor-force participation rates is due solely to time
devoted to having children so that with zero children, the average participation rate would
equal the current male rate (0.76) instead of the current average of male and female rates
25The form may be derived from three primitive assumptions: (i) labor is used to produce two intermediate goods in
amounts y1 and y2 according to the linear technology y1 C y2 D f2; (ii) a unit of good 1 generates a unit of emissions so
Qe D y1, whereas good 2 generates no emissions; and (iii) output per unit of labor is a Cobb-Douglas function f0 y f11 y
1  f1
2 .(If output per unit of labor were a CES function of y1 and y2 with an elasticity other than one, the factor share of emissions
would approach either zero or one as Qe! 0, which may be undesirable to impose.)
26An interpretation is that a unit of labor gives a unit of output and a unit of emissions if no resources are devoted
to abatement, and the cost of abating 1   Qe units of emissions is .1   g0/.1   Qe/g1 units of output. The factor share
of emissions in abatement-cost cases has a knife-edge, which partly motivates why we use Cobb-Douglas for most
calibrations. Without a backstop, the factor share rises monotonically from zero at Qe D 1 to one at Qe D 0; but with any
positive backstop, the factor share rises from zero at Qe D 1 to a peak, then falls to zero at Qe D 0:
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TABLE 1—STEADY STATES
Case
Population
Policy
QNss Qyss QesseC Npeak f
0 Qess
f f=ygss
1. base ( D b D 0:8) none 9.16 0.408 0.101 3.76 0.457
optimal 2.39 0.721 0.386 1.28 0.365 0.211
2.  D b D 2 none 44.1 0.195 0.021 13.9 0.478
optimal 11.1 0.373 0.083 3.52 0.469 0.957
3.  D 0:95; b D 0:8 none 9.90 0.394 0.093 4.16 0.459
optimal 7.32 0.452 0.126 3.12 0.450 0.068
4. f .0:75/ D 0:98 none 15.6 0.418 0.059 4.96 0.357
optimal 3.96 0.665 0.233 1.63 0.311 0.180
5. nC D 1 none 3.57 0.633 0.277 1.17 0.404
optimal 1.20 0.889 0.825 1.00 0.141 0.051
(0.685). Details are in the appendix.
The time cost implies that per-capita labor in the no-cap era is 1   Q QnC D 0:833,
per-capita income is QyC D .1  Q QnC/ f .eC/ D 0:833, and uncapped emissions at t D 0
are EC0  eC.1  Q QnC/ QN0 D 0:833.
A. Base Case
The base case assumes that the scientific knowledge arriving at t D 0 is that an emis-
sions freeze is necessary. A freeze means setting OE D EC0 D 0:833. A reasonable range
of estimated  values is 0:5 5:0 (see e.g. Ogaki and Reinhardt, 1998; Bansal and Yaron,
2004). As base case, we set  D b D 0:8, and we assume Cobb-Douglas production.
Steady-state results for the base case and several alternatives are in table 1. In the base
case, the growth-adjusted optimal population in steady-state is 2:39 times QN0, the steady-
state emissions ratio is 0:386 times the emissions ratio without a cap, and steady-state
output per-capita is 0:721, which is 13:5 percent less than QyC D 0:833. The growth-
adjusted natural population in steady state is 9:16, or almost four (9:16=2:39) times the
optimal population. The emissions ratio of 0:101 and the per-capita output of 0:408 are
substantially less than the optimal values.
The fertility functions (figure 3) imply that the optimal and natural populations con-
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verge smoothly from QN0 D 1 to the steady-state values.27 After five generations, QN 5 D
6:84; for instance, and after ten generations, QN 10 D 8:97; close to the steady-state value
of 9:16.
Figure 3. Base Case Fertilities
Figure 4 shows the actual (not adjusted) optimal and natural populations. In the no-cap
era, population increases exponentially to infinity. With a cap, the optimal and natural
populations grow at rate .   /= D  0:113 in steady state so both actual populations
peak after a cap is imposed and then fall. World population under a cap would peak
at 1:28 times its current level under the optimal population policy, but at 3:76 times its
current level along the natural path, as reported in column Npeak in table 1.
Figure 4. Populations
Permit revenue is 36:5 percent of output in the optimal steady state and 45:7 percent
of output in the natural steady state. These numbers are quite large compared with the
Federal spending share over 1990-2005, which averaged about 20 percent of output. An
intuition for the large revenue comes from figure 1. Population growth under a cap drives
27The appendix describes the numerical procedures. The positively sloped segment of  at N slighly above one is
due to the calibrated time cost of children (which is not present in figure 2): as the cap begins to bind for N > 1, a lower
wage reduces the cost of children.
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down emissions per capita e, which reduces per-capita income and hence fertility. Permit
revenue is f 0.e/e in figure 1. Revenue is small right after the cap is imposed (e.g., 4:2
percent of output at t D 0 under the optimal policy), but increases as the emissions ratio
falls below one. The large revenue numbers in steady state indicate that the process must
go a long way for the economy to get to a new steady state.28 Steady-state revenue is
greater in the natural than the optimal steady state because the emissions ratio declines
further (e0ss D 0:101 versus ess D 0:386).
The optimal child tax in steady state is 21:1 percent of per-capita income.29 To get a
sense of this number in the U.S. context, U.S. personal income is roughly $55,000 per
adult per year, which may be interpreted as uncapped income ( QyC) measured in dollars
per year. Steady-state optimal income ( Qyss), which is 13:5 percent less than uncapped
income, would then be about $48,000. Thus a child tax of 21:1 percent is equivalent to a
tax of about $10,000 each year for 30 years (the length of a generation in the model) for
each child.30 An alternative sense is that the annual cost of a child is about $13,000, of
which about $6,000 is time costs. The optimal child tax therefore raises the full cost of a
child in steady state by about three-quarters, from $13,000 to $23,000, to just under half
($23,000/$48,000) of income.
The time path of the optimal child tax in the base case is shown in row 1 of table 2. The
optimal tax in the transition period t D 0 is substantially less than in steady state. The
base case assumes that uncapped emissions at t D 0 just equal the optimal cap, EC0 D OE .
If information arrived instead that OE is greater or less than EC0 , steady state values for Qyss ,
28As can be seen from figure 1, revenue would not be substantial in only two cases: (i) if the slope f 0 is always
small and there is a high backstop output, so the entire emissions problem could be eliminated at little cost by simply
restricting emissions to zero; or (ii) if f 0 is small until e is close to zero, at which point f bends sharply downward to a
zero backstop, so almost all emissions could be eliminated at little cost. It may be difficult to distinguish the two cases
from current economic observations around e D eC; but neither case is of interest under the maintained hypothesis that
emissions are a serious problem. (In the second case, emissions are a problem only in the future when population has
increased enough so incomes are low.)
29Income excludes redistributions of child-tax revenue, so a tax of 21:1 percent of income is equivalent to a tax of 17:4
.D 21:1=1:211/ percent of income plus redistributions of child-tax revenue.
30Kelly and Kolstad (2001) calculate welfare costs from a marginal child in the range $200-$800. Such costs are
tiny compared with costs of $10,000 per year for 30 years. Kelly and Kolstad implicitly assume a backstop output of
f .0/ D :93 and also assume that population grows at an exogenously given rate that itself decreases at an exogenously
given rate. With their production function in our model, the optimal policy would be to drive the emissions ratio to zero
in steady state. This does not happen in their calculations because they assume growth slows enough so the backstop is
never reached.
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TABLE 2—TIME PATHS OF OPTIMAL CHILD TAXES
Case f=yg0 f=yg1 f=yg2 f=yg3 f=yg4 f=ygss
base case: OE=EC0 D 1 0.110 0.143 0.166 0.181 0.192 0.211
25 percent cut: OE=EC0 D 0:75 0.147 0.168 0.183 0.193 0.199 0.211
25 percent slack: OE=EC0 D 1:25 0.076 0.125 0.154 0.173 0.186 0.211
abatement cost, f .0/ D 0 0.130 0.184 0.216 0.233 0.242 0.249
abatement cost, f .0/ D 0:4 0.094 0.134 0.158 0.173 0.183 0.201
abatement cost, f .0/ D 0:6 0.067 0.090 0.097 0.096 0.090 0
Qess , f 0 Qess= f , and f=ygss , would not change, but QNss=N0 would be proportionally higher
or lower, and the transition paths would differ.31 Notably, the path of optimal child taxes
would differ, as shown in rows 2 and 3 of table 2. If OE=EC0 D 0:75, so emissions must
be cut at t D 0, the optimal policy response is to reduce fertility more aggressively by
setting child taxes higher than under the freeze. If OE=EC0 D 1:25, emission can still
grow and optimal taxes are initially less than under the freeze. In all cases, child taxes
converge to the steady value of 21:1 percent.
B. Sensitivity Analysis–Utility Curvatures
Table 1 also reports sensitivity analysis of individual base-case assumptions. Jones,
Schoenbroodt, and Tertilt (2008) and Jones and Schoonbroodt (2010) argue that . >
1; b > 1/ explains historical fertility trends better than . < 1; b < 1/, so the first sen-
sitivity test assumes  D b D 2 (case 2). Steady-state populations are then substantially
greater, income is lower, and optimal child taxes are higher than in the base case. In
steady state, optimal population is 11:1, income is Qyss D 0:373, and the child tax is 95:7
percent of income (which is 48:9 percent of income plus redistributions of child-tax rev-
enue, 0:957=1:957). The ratio of steady-state natural to optimal population is still about
four (44:1=11:1),
31There are two interpretations of OE=EC0 . First, information about a given OE may arrive earlier or later than assumed
in the base case. If time is re-indexed so information arrives at t D 0, earlier arrival of information means N0 < 1 and
hence EC0 < OE . Second, for given EC0 , one may consider alternative (hypothetical) scientific news that reveal higher or
lower OE . In all cases the dynamics depend on the ratio OE=EC0 .
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Assuming high values of  and b might make sense if one believes fertility is insensi-
tive to economic incentives, but this is a pessimistic assumption here. The fertility path in
figure 5 makes clear why. A cap reduces children’s utility, and when b > 1; this causes a
burst in natural fertility. As a result, a greater income fall and hence a greater population
are needed to reduce fertility to replacement. Moreover, the wide gap between natural
and optimal fertility implies that high child taxes are needed to implement the optimal
fertility.
Figure 5. Dynamics when  D b D 2.
We also consider the equal-curvatures assumption, ! D 1. Because ! measures how
much parents care about per-child consumption relative to the number of children, and
the population externality is a loss from lower per-child consumption, a lower ! tends
to reduce the utility value of the externality. Thus real reductions in children’s utility
and the real population externality might be substantial, but with low !; parents would
simply not care much about this so the gap between natural and optimal population would
be small. To judge this, we modify the baseline case, assuming ! D 0:25. When  D
0:95 and b D 0:8 (case 3), the ratio of natural to optimal steady-state population is 1:4
and the steady-state child tax is 6:8 percent.
The population externality thus tends to be substantial because empirically reasonable
assumptions about utility curvature imply that the desire to have children remains strong
as et falls below eC; so et ends up being driven a fair bit below eC.
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C. Sensitivity Analysis–Technology
Optimal policy depends on the cost of reducing emissions. Table 1 (case 4) reports
steady-state results when f is parameterized assuming it costs 2 percent of output to
reduce emissions by 25 percent ( f .0:75/ D 0:98), instead of 3 percent as in the base
case. This reduces the population externality but not greatly: the optimal child tax falls
from 21:1 percent in the base case to 18:0 percent. The reason is that when it is less costly
to reduce emissions, incomes and hence fertility are higher at any given population, and
steady state is reached only when population is so high and the emissions ratio so low
that incomes are close to incomes in the base case. That is, the income reductions needed
to choke off population growth doesn’t change much when the output cost of reducing
emissions falls.32
We also examine the abatement-cost specification. Under base-case utility assump-
tions, the critical backstop is f B D 0:507 so we consider backstops of 0, 0.4, and 0.6.
Comparing the first two rows of table 3 with the first two rows of table 1 shows the effects
of changing from a Cobb-Douglas to an abatement-cost specification with no backstop.
Steady-state natural and optimal populations fall by a bit less than half and factor shares
of emissions rise, but optimal child taxes change little, rising from 21:1 percent to 24:9
percent of income. Comparing rows of table 3, a higher backstop means smaller income
reductions as well as lower population externalities, but the effect is not great as long as
f .0/ < 0:507 (so growth-adjusted population is constant in steady state). From table 3,
the ratio of the natural to the optimal steady-state populations varies between about three
and five when f .0/ < 0:507.
If f .0/ > 0:507; adjusted population grows forever and the population externality
vanishes in the limit, quite a different long-run outcome than when f .0/ < 0:507: The
paths of the economy for the first few periods after transition, however, can be similar.
32In detail, steady-state natural income is slightly higher than in the base case, 0:418 instead of 0:408, but steady-state
optimal income is lower, 0:665 instead of 0:721. The smaller difference between Qyss and Qyss means the real externality
terms f 0.e/e in (18) are lower. Steady-state emission ratios are much reduced: Qess is only 0:059 instead of 0:101 in the
base case, and Qess is 0:233 instead of 0:386. Consequently, QNss and QNss are roughly two-thirds greater than in the base
case, but their ratio remains about four.
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TABLE 3—STEADY STATES WITH ABATEMENT-COST PRODUCTION
Case
Population
Policy
QNss Qyss QesseC Npeak f
0 Qess
f f=ygss
f .0/ D 0 none 4.84 0.374 0.190 2.85 0.842
optimal 1.58 0.805 0.586 1.09 0.431 0.249
f .0/ D 0:4 none 15.6 0.438 0.059 4.33 0.168
optimal 2.84 0.702 0.325 1.36 0.348 0.201
f .0/ D 0:6 none 1 0.532 0 1 0
optimal 1 0.532 0 1 0 0
Table 2 shows this. With f .0/ D 0:6, abatement costs at any Qe are reduced by 60 percent
compared with abatement costs with f .0/ D 0; and the optimal child tax in the transition
period is similarly about half of the tax when f .0/ D 0. With f .0/ D 0:6; the tax peaks
in the second period after transition at almost 10 percent, which is still about half the tax
in the base case, then goes to zero in steady state.33
D. Sensitivity Analysis–Trend Assumptions
An important possibility is that birth rates may decline due to demographic transitions
unrelated to the environment. Becker (1960) views fertility as a mix of two variables,
child quantity and child quality, and the demographic transition as a shift from a high-
quantity/low-quality mix to a low-quantity/high-quality one. Subsequent literature has
proposed a number of mechanisms for the shift, some stressing effects of mass education
(Caldwell, 1980, 1982). Studying the case of countries in demographic transition by
taking a stand on the details behind the shift and adding a full model of the demographic
transition is beyond the scope of the current paper. However, it is easy to alter the trend
assumptions of the model to evaluate alternative assumptions about demographic and
productivity trends.
The maintained hypothesis that emissions are a problem requires QnC D nC= > 1 so
emissions tend to rise on their own. Broadly, changes in trend assumptions that lower QnC
33In the case with f .0/ D 0:6, both QNss and QNss go to infinity but their ratio converges to about 3:4. Also, population
growth remains positive as the emissions ratio converges to zero: Qnt converges to 1:16 and actual (not adjusted) population
growth nt D Qnt .=/ converges to 1:03: In the limit, nt converges to the same limit of 1:03. This is substantially lower
than population growth of nC D 1:52 in the uncapped economy.
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mean less pressure from emissions growth, which reduces the population externality.
In the base case the underlying trends in population and technology growth equal ac-
tual values over 1990-2005, nC D 1:52 and = D 1:13; so QnC D 1:72. To evaluate
a world in which all countries have undergone a demographic transition, we recalibrate
the model to the replacement value nC D 1, so world population would remain constant
absent policy. Then QnC D 1:13; as the only force driving emissions growth is technolog-
ical change in a person’s carbon footprint =: In table 1 (case 5), the implied population
externality is 5.1 percent of parental income per child, lower than in the base case but not
negligible.34
Because QnC D nC=, the same 5.1 percent steady-state externality would arise if
assumed fertility (nC) were left at the base case value of 1:52 but the environmental
productivity-growth factor  were instead assumed to increase permanently from 1:48 to
2:25 D 1:48  1:52.
E. Sensitivity to Environmental Assumptions
This section examines how results differ when S1-S3 are relaxed and greenhouse gas
stocks enter as state variable. The goal is to explore the sensitivity of previous results to
slight generalizations of the model. Modeling of the environment in detail is beyond the
scope of the paper.
We follow integrated assessment models in assuming that damages are caused by at-
mospheric temperatures (X T ), which are caused by greenhouse gas stocks (X G) that
accumulate over time from emissions, and that damages have the functional form t D
.X Tt /=.1C .X Tt // with quadratic .X Tt / D 0  .X Tt /2, 0 > 0 (e.g., see Nordhaus and
Boyer 2000). We model X Tt D  log.1 C X Gt /= log.2/ as logarithmic with temperature
sensitivity parameter  > 0 and X GtC1 D  X Gt CEt as linear with parameter  2 .0; 1/.35
34This scenario is also extreme in two ways: (i) it assumes poor countries reduce fertility to replacement without
any increase in incomes and hence emissions; and (ii) it ignores other sources of population growth such as changes in
mortality. The United Nations (2010) median-fertility population projection assumes fertility in all countries is close to
replacement, and finds that world population should nonetheless continue to grow until about 2100.
35Temperature X T is measured in degrees Celsius and X G as greenhouse gas concentration above pre-industrial level.
The unit coefficient on E is a normalization. A logarithmic form linking radiative forcing (temperature) to greenhouse
gas stocks is a standard assumption. We simplify by abstracting from dynamics in this relationship and from interactions
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Combining these assumptions, the environmental state is univariate, X t D Xt D X Gt , and
the damage function is:
(22) t D .X t/ D

h

log.2/ log.1C X t/
i
1C 
h

log.2/ log.1C X t/
i .
We calibrate  D 0:75,  D 3, and 0 D 7:7  10 4.36
Pindyck (2013) argues that models with quadratic costs and constant temperature sen-
sitivity are inadequate for modeling damages at high greenhouse gas levels. This is im-
portant here because (calibrated) human preferences for children are strong, and hence a
threat of high damages is needed to trigger damage-avoiding policies. Hence we inter-
pret the regime shift at t D 0 as discovery of a critical range X in which damages are
greater than under (22).37 We model this critical range numerically in three versions that
relax S1-S3 successively.
First we replace S3 by (22) but maintain S1-S2; that is, (22) applies only for Et  OE .
Solving the general Bellman equation (4) then yields Et D Et D minfeC QL t ; OEg, where
QL t D .1  Q Qnt/ QNt accounts for growth and time costs of children. That is, a cap at OE is
still optimal.
Initial values require care because X G is a physical variable: current greenhouse gas
stocks are about 40 percent above pre-industrial levels, so X0 D 0:40 is a given. For
t  0, uncapped emissions grow at rate QnC   1.38 Hence X t D Pi1  i 1 Et i D
eC QL t=. QnC  /, so X t D .1  Q QnC/eC QNt=. QnC  / for t  0 is proportional to population.
To reach X0 D 0:40 at t D 0 it must be that eC QN0 D 0:464. To normalize QN0 D 1,
with additional variables (e.g., ocean temperatures; see Nordhaus and Boyer 2000, Kelly and Kolstad 2001).
36Setting  D 0:75  0:93 converts an estimated persistence of 0.9 per decade (e.g. Kelly-Kolstad 2001) to 30-year,
generational frequency;  D 3 is fairly standard (as round number); 0 D 0:00077 is calibrated so  matches Nordhaus
and Boyer’s (2000, Table 4-10) estimate that non-catastrophic damages are 0.48% of output at 2.5 degree warming,
Calibrations with reasonably higher or lower values yield similar results.
37Earlier work also noted a role for catastrophic damages. In Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), for example, the expected
value of possible catastrophic damage is more than twice the non-catastrophic cost (1.02% vs. 0.48%). We follow
Pindyck in modeling catastrophe separately,
38This involves a slight approximation because t > 0 implies reduced output, which affects fertility even if house-
holds do not recognize the cause of reduced output. However, .X t / for t < 0 (so X t < 0:4) is so small that we calibrate
QnC as before.
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TABLE 4—STEADY STATES WITH NON-ZERO DAMAGES
Case
Population
Policy
Ess Xss ss QNss QesseC Qyss f
0 Qe
f
1. cap OE none 0.386 1.55 0.012 8.91 0.104 0.408 0.456
optimal 0.386 1.55 0.012 2.34 0.395 0.717 0.362
2. cap OX none 0.172 0.686 0.004 4.03 0.102 0.408 0.457
optimal 0.172 0.686 0.004 1.05 0.389 0.719 0.364
3. smooth  none 0.175 0.701 0.048 3.72 0.112 0.408 0.454
optimal 0.174 0.697 0.027 1.03 0.404 0.713 0.358
TABLE 5—TIME PATHS OF OPTIMAL CHILD TAXES WITH NON-ZERO DAMAGES
Case f=yg0 f=yg1 f=yg2 f=yg3 f=yg4 f=ygss
1. cap OE 0.109 0.143 0.165 0.181 0.191 0.209
2. cap OX 0.186 0.208 0.214 0.212 0.211 0.210
3. smooth  0.184 0.206 0.213 0.212 0.210 0.207
we must assume eC D 0:464, which implies uncapped emissions EC0 D 0:386.39 The
discovery that an emissions freeze is needed thus means OE D 0:386.
Case 1 (labeled  for damage) in tables 4-5 show results for this scenario. Steady
state values and the path of tax rates both are quite similar to the base case (case 1 in
tables 1-2). This suggests S3 is a reasonable simplification.40 Intuitively, when a parent
spends almost 25 percent of income on a child ( C D 0:248), damages of ss D 0:012
are too small to change fertility significantly.
Second, we drop S2 and assume instead that there is a critical value OX for greenhouse
gas stocks such that (22) applies for X t  OX and .X t/ D 1 for X t > OX . (S1 still applies,
now with X D fX t > OXg.) For illustration, we set OX D  X0 C EC0 D QnCX0 D 0:686.
This yields a scenario comparable to case 1 in the sense that uncapped emissions at
t D 0 would place the economy on the verge of disaster.
Replacing OE by OX alters the dynamics between t D 0 and the steady state. The
39This follows from QnC D 1:716,  D 0:75, and Q QnC D 0:17.
40Assumption S3 is important to streamline the exposition. Without S3, the analysis in the previous sections would
require a multi-dimensional state space . QN ; X/ even when damages are small.
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steady state ratio Ess=Xss D 1    is much less the initial ratio EC0 =X0 D QnC    ,
because greenhouse gas stocks catch up when emissions stop growing. When emissions
are frozen at t D 0, greenhouse gas stocks will grow to Xss D OE=.1    / D . QnC  
 /X0=.1   /; but when stocks are frozen at Xss D OX , emissions must decline to Ess D
.1   / OX D 0:172.
Case 2 in tables 4-5 show results for OX D 0:686. Steady-state population in case
2 is less than half of population in case 1, roughly in proportion to reduced emissions
(56 percent cut from 0:386 to 0:172). The per-capita variables in case 2 are, however,
similar in case 1. In table 5, tax rates for case 2 are higher than in 1. The intuition
is as in the main model: a cut in emissions requires high tax rates during the transition
(see row 2 versus row 1 in table 2). In summary, results with cap OX are similar to results
with cap OE , provided one adjusts for differences in steady-state emissions. A substantive
insight is that freezing greenhouse gas stocks implies cutting emissions and hence higher
child taxes at t D 0 than in the baseline calibration.
Third, we modify S1 by assuming a smooth damage function that follows (22) for
X t  OX and ends at . OX C 1 OX/ D 1 for some 1 OX > 0. With smooth damages,
determining optimal emissions is is no longer a simple problem, and it is beyond the
scope of this paper to survey the range of possible specifications. We present only one
scenario for illustration, setting OX D 0:686, 1 OX D OX=10, and assuming a quadratic
damage function for X t > OX . Then (22) applies for greenhouse gas levels up to 0:686,
and marginal damages increase linearly on the interval [ OX ; OX C1 OX ] D [0:686; 0:762].
Greenhouse gas stocks are again bounded (now at 0:762), but optimal emissions, optimal
greenhouse gas dynamics, and optimal "acceptable" damages are endogenous. Case 3 in
tables 4-5 shows that steady-state values and tax rates are similar to case 2, and damages
are higher (due to Xss > OX ). A notable difference is that steady state emissions take
slightly different values with and without child taxes. Intuitively, restricting emissions
is more costly in terms of output when fertility is untaxed, so optimal emissions without
child taxes are higher (0:175 versus 0:174).41 In summary, results with smooth damage
41Key features of case 3 are that greenhouse gas stocks are bounded and that marginal damages are high enough to
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function are more complicated than results with catastrophe at OX , but not necessarily
much different with regard to population and child taxes.
VII. Concluding Thoughts
In thinking about population policy, it is useful to know the magnitude of the induced
population externality as this equals the tax/subsidy policy that is optimal for currently
living individuals. We consider a specific case that suggests population externalities
induced by underlying externalities can be large: we take as a maintained hypothesis
that global warming is a serious problem and a cap is imposed, and that the problem
does not go away because of fortuitous shifts in productivity or a permanent decline in
fertility to less than replacement. The induced population externality is generally large.
To speculate beyond this paper, many current tax, welfare, and school policies sub-
sidize children, so it is likely that net policy today is pronatalist. Positive population
externalities from pay-as-you-go policies and from scale/spillover effects in human cap-
ital formation may partly explain this. To evaluate this more fully and also to understand
economic pressures on population policy generally, it may be useful to measure the con-
tributions of different underlying externalities to the aggregate induced population exter-
nality. If emissions restrictions are imposed, however, then the analysis here suggests
that, all else equal, there may be pressure to make population policy less pronatalist.
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